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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which the cultural dimension of individualism-
collectivism matters for the stringency of climate change policies across the world. I 
postulate that individualistic societies are endowed with a better capacity to implement 
stringent climate change regulations compared with their collectivistic counterparts. 
This notion is tested using data for a world sample of up to 92 countries. To achieve 
causal inference, I isolate exogenous sources of variation in individualistic cultures, 
based on blood distance to the UK and historical pathogen prevalence. The results lend 
strong empirical support to my propositions. I also find evidence that individualism 
exerts a positive influence on the stringency of climate change policies through 
enhancing the quality of governance and female political presentation. To account for 
unobserved country-specific factors, I perform subnational analyses using data from the 
World Values Survey. The results indicate that survey participants with an orientation 
towards individualistic cultures tend to self-report positive attitudes to pro-
environmental policies, which is consistent with the international evidence. 
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1. Introduction  
It is widely perceived that climate change is one of the most serious impediments to achieving 
the Sustainable Development Goals. Addressing this global concern requires drastic reductions 
of greenhouse gas emissions across the world (IPCC, 2014). In this regard, the objective of 
limiting global warming is reflected in the Paris Climate Agreement that calls for international 
commitments to keep the global temperature increase in this century below two degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, there has been little success in undertaking these 
ambitious efforts at the global and regional levels. More specifically, climate change policies 
are still far from resulting in strong emission abatement (Ziegler, 2017). Part of the explanation 
for this holds that we lack a profound understanding of the social and economic environment 
that fosters effective climate change actions. Therefore, it is of importance to explore the 
drivers of the stringency of climate change regulations before we can formulate relevant 
policies to mitigate global warming.  
There exist considerable worldwide discrepancies in the implementation of climate 
change policies (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013). To capture this global divergence, a recent study 
by Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013) constructs an index of climate change cooperation (CCPI) 
for up to 172 countries, covering the period from 1996 to 2008. The authors, in particular, 
attempt to measure international differences in efforts to reduce climate change. According to 
Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013), the cross-country variation in the stringency of climate change 
regulations is reflected in the extent to which a country is cooperative in international 
agreements to mitigate global warming, and the trend in its emission levels over years. Based 
on this information, the authors provide an internationally comparable indicator measuring the 
stringency of climate change policies with the broadest coverage of countries and years. Figure 
1 demonstrates the unequal distribution of the stringency of climate change policies across the 
world, measured by the CCPI index of Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013).   
These disparities motivate a growing number of studies examining the determinants of 
climate change regulations across countries. Institutional quality, among others, has been well 
documented as an essential driver of the implementation of climate change and environmental 
regulations (see, e.g., Congleton, 1992;  Neumayer, 2002a;  Fredriksson et al., 2007;  Von 
Stein, 2008;  Bernauer & Koubi, 2013;  Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013, 2016).1 Recent 
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contributions to this body of literature postulate that a country’s legal heritage is relevant for 
addressing global warming (Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2015;  Ang & Fredriksson, 2017). 
Other scholars, however, put a premium on the role of trade openness and gender roles in 
strengthening the capacity to combat climate change (see, for instance, Neumayer, 2002b;  
Damania et al., 2003;  Mavisakalyan & Tarverdi, 2019). 
The above line of research provides important insights into the cross-country divergence 
in the stringency of environmental and climate change policies. Nevertheless, previous studies 
have predominantly focused on overall environmental performance while little attention has 
been paid particularly to the adoption of climate change policies.2 Importantly, the main interest 
of most existing papers, as reviewed above, is the “proximate” determinants of environmental 
and climate change regulations, such as corruption, democracy, governance and trade policies. 
These factors are jointly determined and interrelated with environmental quality. Thus, they 
offer a limited understanding of the root causes of climate change policies. Indeed, fostering 
climate-friendly activities necessitates tracing their deep origins besides proximate factors. For 
this reason, a key inquiry emerging from the existing literature is what fundamentally explains 
the implementation of stringent climate change policies across the globe.3 This paper, therefore, 
attempts to offer a deeper or more fundamental explanation to this strand of literature. To this 
end, I propose a novel hypothesis that individualistic cultures help strengthen climate change 
policies through enhancing the quality of governance and female political representation. 
This study builds upon a recent contribution to the long-term comparative development 
literature asserting that individualistic cultures lie at the root of global income differences 
(Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017). Specifically, these scholars posit that individualism puts a 
greater emphasis on personal autonomy and accomplishments, which strengthens incentives 
for innovation. Collectivistic societies, by contrast, value conformity and discourage any 
deviations from social norms. These cultural traits ultimately shape economic prosperity in the 
world by affecting innovative activities (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017). Recent studies find 
strong evidence that individualism improves the quality of governance (Kyriacou, 2016), and 
reduces corruption (Jha & Panda, 2017), income inequality (Nikolaev et al., 2017) and gender 
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discrimination (Davis & Williamson, 2019). This paper, however, offers a fresh perspective to 
this emerging body of research by documenting that individualism is also conducive to climate 
change policies. 
 To my knowledge, this is the first paper linking individualism and the stringency of 
climate change policies. I posit that individualistic societies have better capacity to implement 
stringent climate mitigation policies compared with their collectivistic counterparts. Two 
mechanisms that helps explain this positive relationship include the quality of governance and 
women’s participation in national parliaments. The findings of this paper help advance our 
understanding of the long-term determinants of climate change and environmental regulations. 
The results, therefore, offer several useful implications for designing climate change policies, 
and potentially motivate a fruitful discussion on the link between cultures and the environment. 
This will be discussed in detail in the final section.  
Furthermore, the current research directly relates to Xiang et al. (2019) who argue that 
an orientation toward individualistic cultures is negatively correlated with climate-friendly 
activities, which is in sharp contrast with my hypothesis. Their approach, however, relies on 
data obtained from a survey of 182 undergraduate students in China, making it difficult to draw 
an overall understanding of the link between individualism and climate change policies across 
the globe. In this respect, I differ from their paper by examining a world sample of countries to 
provide a broader insight into the role of cultural values in fostering climate-friendly actions. 
Later, I also perform an individual-level analysis, which also suggests that individualism is 
positively associated with pro-environmental policies. Importantly, the findings of Xiang et al. 
(2019) are based on estimating relatively parsimonious OLS regressions that may be biased 
and inconsistent essentially because of some endogeneity concerns. For this reason, I further 
depart from their study by considering these econometric issues more thoroughly. 
To empirical test the main hypothesis, I estimate a model using cross-sectional data for 
up to 92 countries. A key challenge of identification in this framework stems from potential 
endogeneity concerns. Hence, I follow Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) to generate the 
exogenous components of individualism, using an index of blood distance to the UK and the 
historical prevalence of infectious diseases as instrumental variables. The cross-country 
evidence, in particular, indicates that the exogenous variation in individualism exerts a positive 
influence on climate change policies. My findings appear to be largely robust to a variety of 
falsification tests. I also find evidence supporting the notion that individualism affects climate 
change regulations by enhancing the quality of governance and female political representation. 
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To control for unobserved country-specific factors, I further conduct subnational analyses 
using data from six waves of the World Values Survey. The results reveal that survey 
participants who self-report an orientation toward individualism tend to have positive attitudes 
toward pro-environmental policies. This provides strong empirical support to the international 
evidence. 
The rest of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework that links individualistic cultures and the stringency of climate change policies. 
Section 3 discusses empirical strategies and data. I present the cross-country evidence in 
Section 4, followed by an analysis of channels of transmission in Section 5. Next, Section 6 
discusses individual-level evidence, and the final section concludes.  
2. A theoretical perspective 
The central hypothesis of this study postulates that individualistic cultures exert a positive 
influence on the stringency of climate change policies. This section, therefore, explores two 
potential channels of transmission that help explain this positive relationship. I propose that 
individualistic societies enjoy greater capacity to implement climate change policies because 
their cultures foster the quality of governance and female political representation. 
Governance 
There exists ample empirical evidence demonstrating that good governance is conducive 
to environmental performance and the stringency of energy and environmental policies. Part 
of the explanation is that environmental protection is characterized as a public good, thus 
requiring government intervention (Dasgupta & De Cian, 2018). Several studies, for example, 
find that good governance reduces pollution, emissions and deforestation, and improves the 
stringency of environmental regulations (e.g., López & Mitra, 2000;  Damania et al., 2003;  
Fredriksson & Svensson, 2003;  Welsch, 2004;  Barbier et al., 2005;  Wilson & Damania, 2005;  
Fredriksson et al., 2007;  Bernauer & Koubi, 2013).4 Further, countries with democratic 
institutions are more likely to ratify the Montreal Protocol, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and other multilateral environmental 
agreements (see, e.g., Congleton, 1992;  Fredriksson & Gaston, 2000;  Neumayer, 2002a;  
Fredriksson et al., 2007;  Von Stein, 2008). 
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It follows from the above line of inquiry that the quality of governance helps strengthen 
the stringency of environmental and energy policies, and a country’s commitments to 
international agreements on climate change. An interesting question emerging from these 
findings is how to create a good institutional environment that fosters climate change policies. 
I propose that individualistic values exert a positive influence on the ability to adopt stringent 
climate change policies through affecting institutions. More specifically, the extent to which 
the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism matters for governance has gained much 
attention among economists. An early study by Scott (1972), for example, demonstrates that 
the prevalence of corruption in much of the developing world is attributable to parochial ties 
and gift-giving practices that nurture interpersonal relationships. Additionally, collectivism 
represents a cultural trait characterized by in-group favoritism. Thus, allegiance to social 
relationships and collective actions may be conducive to nepotism and clientelism, which 
ultimately induce patronage and corrupt activities in the public sphere (Tanzi, 1994;  Smith, 
2003;  Greif, 2006). 
Further, collectivistic countries characterized by a strong hierarchical structure may 
suffer from poorer governance because this social organization engenders the emergence of 
powerful elites. Meanwhile, powerful bureaucrats tend to engage in corrupt behaviors that 
exploit public resources for private gain (Vu, 2020). Recent empirical studies show that 
individualism is a strong predictor of cross-country differences in the quality of governance 
(e.g., Kyriacou, 2016;  Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017;  Jha & Panda, 2017). As argued earlier, 
institutional quality plays an essential role in the implementation of climate change policies. 
Hence, it is plausible that collectivistic cultures hinder the adoption of climate change policies 
if they exert a negative influence on the quality of governance. 
Another argument for the positive effect of individualism on climate change policies rests 
upon conventional wisdom holding that individualistic cultures are a key conduit of innovation. 
This is because individualistic societies attach greater social prestige to innovators, which 
stimulates a country’s innovative activities (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017). Further, good 
institutions, which are partly affected by cultural values, arguably reduce the uncertainty costs 
incurred by innovators, thus strengthening the innovation process. This mechanism is 
particularly relevant for fostering climate change policies, which critically require a transition 
toward green technologies. In this vein, Fredriksson and Wollscheid (2008)  find that strong 
governance spurs investments in pollution control technologies, which help reduce the 
ecological footprint of economic activities.  
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Female political representation 
Another channel of influence rests upon the premise that individualism promotes female 
political representation that critically fosters the stringency of climate change policies.  This 
mechanism of transmission, in particular, is mainly motivated by the proposition that women 
demonstrate a greater awareness and concern toward global warming relative to men (see, e.g., 
Dietz et al., 2002;  McCright, 2010;  McCright & Dunlap, 2011;  Xiao & McCright, 2015). 
Indeed, gender differences in overall responsibilities for the well-being of others have been 
well documented by Beutel and Marini (1995). To the extent that women exhibit a greater 
awareness of climate change and other social issues, their participation in the public sphere 
may arguably facilitate formulating and adopting more stringent climate change regulation. 
Moreover, the contribution to climate change is also gender-differentiated with men 
performing more economic activities that induce global warming. This is mainly attributable 
to gender differences in social roles (see, e.g., Spitzner, 2009). A recent report of the United 
Nations Environment Program indicates that the negative consequences of climate change are 
gender-differentiated (UNEP, 2016). Conventional wisdom holds that women are more 
vulnerable to the adverse effect of global warming compared with their male counterparts. 
These arguments, taken together, suggest that a greater inclusion of women in policy-making 
acts as a catalyst for climate-friendly policies. More recently, Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi 
(2019) find that the fraction of seats held by women in national parliaments exerts a positive 
influence on the implementation of climate change policies throughout the world.  
There are good reasons to envisage that individualistic societies have better capacity to 
promote women’s political participation. Foremost, individualism emphasizes the importance 
of autonomy, personal control and individual accomplishments. Importantly, these cultural 
values are prerequisites of an egalitarian society, and this may also transcend gender identities 
(Davis & Williamson, 2019). Collectivistic countries, by contrast, put a premium on in-group 
favoritism and mutual obligations, which may attach subordinate roles to women. As argued 
earlier, collectivistic cultures characterize a strong hierarchical social structure within a society. 
This also engenders a greater social acceptability of gender inequality. 
The positive link between individualism and gender equality is also in line with several 
studies documenting that strong family ties and participation in collective religious activities 
are detrimental for women’s participation in the labor market and gender equitable attitudes 
(see, e.g., Seguino, 2011;  Alesina & Giuliano, 2014). Employing data from the World Values 
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Surveys, Davis and Williamson (2019) indicate that people living in collectivistic countries are 
more likely to self-report negative attitudes toward gender equality. Therefore, it is plausible 
that gender equality may prevail in individualistic societies, which fosters women’s 
representation in national parliaments. Overall, I posit that individualistic cultures help 
strengthen female political representation, which ultimately leads to more stringent climate 
change regulation. 
A synthesis of hypotheses 
 The narrative presented above highlights that there exist strong theoretical arguments 
for why the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism matters for cross-country 
differences in the stringency of climate change policies. Accordingly, individualistic cultures 
may transmit to global warming regulations via affecting institutional quality and female 
gender representation. The rest of this paper, therefore, explores the relationship between 
individualism and climate change policies. I also provide empirical evidence on the 
mechanisms of transmission discussed in this section.  
3. Methods and data 
Econometric methods 
To explore the link between individualism and climate change policies, I estimate the following 
cross-country model: 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐼𝐷𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝐼 is an index of climate change cooperation, reflecting the cross-country variation 
in the stringency of climate change policies (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013). 𝐼𝐷𝑉 denotes a 
measure of individualism of Hofstede (2001). 𝑋 is the set of control variables discussed in the 
following sections. 𝛽 captures the causal effect of individualism on climate change policies. 
Subscript i stands for country i. 𝜀 represents the stochastic disturbance term. 
A key issue when estimating the causal influence of individualistic cultures on climate 
change policies stems from potential endogeneity bias. More specifically, the identification of  𝛽 can be biased and consistent if reverse causation exists. It is widely perceived that economic 
performance affects a country’s cultural development (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017). This 
view posits that economic prosperity may induce more individualistic cultures. Hence, it is 
plausible that the implementation of climate change regulations, which is jointly determined 
and interrelated with economic prosperity, may exert an influence on a country’s cultural 
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values. Further, obtaining causal inference requires paying special attention to unobserved 
country-specific factors that are difficult to account for in a cross-country framework. An 
additional concern is that proxies for individualism and climate change policies may be subject 
to measurement bias. These issues, if they exist, may engender endogeneity bias. 
To address the above concern, I create exogenous sources of variation in individualistic 
cultures based on blood distance to the United Kingdom (distB_UK) and the historical 
prevalence of infectious diseases (pathogen), following Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). In 
particular, distB_UK captures genetic distance to the UK, which consistently rank among the 
most individualistic societies in the world, based on frequencies of blood types.5  According to 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), the use of this instrumental variable is mainly motivated 
by several contributions in the epidemiological literature documenting a strong correlation 
between cultural values and the presence of several alleles. Specifically, cultural values and 
genetic traits simultaneously transmit across generations from parents to offspring.6 This is 
suggestive that genetic distance is a strong instrument for the cross-country variation in cultural 
values. 
Further, an advantage of employing data on frequencies of blood types rests upon their 
broad coverage of countries across the world. Importantly, as emphasized by Gorodnichenko 
and Roland (2017), genetic distance to the UK provides a plausibly exogenous source of 
variation in culture that is not related to economic performance. In particular, the authors argue 
that neutral genetic differences across countries, unaffected by the historical event of European 
colonization since the sixteenth century, were mainly shaped during the period of the Neolithic 
migration dating back several millennia ago. For this reason, genetic variation does not directly 
affect contemporary economic performance other than through shaping cultural values. Hence, 
the instrument reasonably exerts no direct influence on climate change policies, thus satisfying 
the exclusion restriction.7  
I further employ an index capturing the historical prevalence of infectious diseases 
(pathogen) as an additional instrument, following a number of studies (e.g., Fincher et al., 
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institutional quality and female political representation. If blood distance has no direct effect on economic 
outcomes, it is difficult to envisage another channel through which blood distance transmits to climate change 
regulations. This at least in part lends some support to the exclusion restrictions.  
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2008;  Thornhill & Fincher, 2014;  Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017;  Nikolaev et al., 2017). 
The basic argument for this rests upon the premise that places with stronger pathogenic stress 
created a favorable environment for collectivistic cultures, which constitute a key defense 
mechanism against infectious diseases.8 Hence, the pervasiveness of morbidity shaped a culture 
of conformity, in-group favoritism and placed significant limits on personal autonomy (Murray 
& Schaller, 2010). Importantly, the main attraction of using two instrumental variables is to 
perform the test of over-identifying restrictions.9  
Data 
The main dependent variable is the Climate Change Cooperation index (CCPI) of 
Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013).10 This indicator reflects the stringency of climate change 
policies for up to 172 countries from 1996 to 2008 (Figure 1).11 As discussed earlier, this 
measure reflects the extent to which a country is cooperative in multilateral environmental 
agreements to mitigate climate change. Further, it also considers the variation in emission 
levels, which has been widely used as a proxy for cross-country differences in the stringency 
of climate change policies (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013). To my knowledge, this index is the 
best measure of the stringency of climate change policies across the world mainly because of 
its wide coverage of both countries and years.  
CCPI encompasses two sub-components, namely the policy and emission sides. The 
policy component, in particular, captures a country’s contribution to global environmental 
agreements. The policy side is mainly based on experts’ assessments about the extent to which 
an economy was cooperative in multilateral environmental agreements, considering whether it 
did so in a timely manner.12 The emission component utilizes the cross-country variation in the 
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level of CO2 emissions per capita in 1990 and its variation between 1990 and 2002. All this 
information is aggregated to obtain an overall measure of climate change policies, ranging 
between zero and 100 (Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2013). Higher values of this index correspond to 
more pro-active climate change policies.13 Later, I will also check the sensitivity of the baseline 
estimates by using other measures of environmental performance.  
To measure cross-country differences in cultural values, I employ an index of 
individualism (IDV) developed by Hofstede (2001).14 This indicator ranges between 0 and 100, 
with higher values corresponding to a more individualistic society. Figure 2 illustrates the 
cross-country variation in individualistic cultures. According to Hofstede (2001), the national 
level measure of individualism is based on an aggregation of individual-level data of cultural 
values obtained through various surveys in each country. To avoid measurement bias induced 
by using a perception-based indicator, I will also use a series of other measures of individualism 
as a robustness check. Data on the historical prevalence of infectious diseases and blood 
distance to the UK are obtained from Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). The original data 
sources of these instrumental variables are collected from various sources as presented in detail 
by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). See also the online appendix for some additional 
information regarding variables’ descriptions and data sources.   
4. Cross-country evidence 
4.1. Main results 
Figure 3 demonstrates unconditional correlations between the index of individualism and 
various measures of the stringency of climate change polices. Accordingly, individualism is 
positively correlated with CCPI, the main proxy for pro-active climate change policies (Panel 
A, Figure 3). Further, IDV is also positively associated with the Environmental Performance 
index and the Environmental Sustainability index as presented in Panels B and C of Figure 3, 
respectively.15 These positive associations are consistent with the main hypothesis presented 
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in Section 2. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such correlations may not reflect a causal 
influence essentially because of some endogeneity concerns discussed earlier. For this reason, 
I estimate the benchmark model using IV-2SLS regressions. 
The baseline estimates are represented in Table 1. I first regress CCPI on the 
individualism index, using an OLS regression in column (1) of Table 1. Accordingly, the 
estimated coefficient of individualism is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This is consistent with my propositions. As argued earlier, the OLS estimates can be biased 
and inconsistent if the main variable of interest (IDV) is correlated with the disturbance term. 
However, the results are reported essentially for purposes of comparison. From columns (2) to 
(4) of Table 1, I present the IV-2SLS estimates to correct for potential endogeneity bias. 
Specifically, I use distB_UK to isolate an exogenous source of variation in individualistic 
cultures in column (2) while pathogen is used as an instrument in column (3). The first-stage 
estimates indicate that these instrumental variables are strongly correlated with IDV (Panel B, 
Table 1). Turning to the results in panel A of Table 1, I find that individualism exerts a positive 
influence on climate change policies once I account for potential endogeneity bias. The effect 
is also precisely estimated throughout using different instruments. 
 Results remain largely unchanged when I employ both instrumental variables in the 
same regression (column 4, Table 1). The magnitude of the estimated coefficients of 
individualism suggests that a one-unit increase in the IDV is associated with approximately a 
0.033-unit increase in the CCPI. This effect is much larger than the OLS estimates. The 
individualism index values for Iran and Belgium are 41 and 75, respectively. The difference 
between these two countries is 34, which is roughly 1.55 standard deviations of the IDV index 
(Table A1, online appendix). If Iran were to experience the IDV values of Belgium, the 
predicted increase in the CCPI of Iran would be 1.12, approximately 0.7 of a standard deviation 
of CCPI.16 This result implies that individualism exerts a reasonably sizeable impact on the 
stringency of climate change policies.  
The endogeneity test of Hausman (1978) indicates that individualism is not strictly 
exogenous in the baseline model. This suggests that using the IV-2SL estimates is required for 
drawing causal inference on the effect of individualism on climate change policies. I also 
perform several diagnostics tests to check whether the IV-2SLS estimates provide a valid basis 
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for statistical inference. In particular, the results of the F test of excluded instruments are much 
bigger than the rule-of-thumb value of 10 in all cases. This implies that distB_UK and pathogen 
are not weak instruments. Following Anderson and Rubin (1949), I conduct the test of robust 
inference to weak instruments under the null that the estimated effect of IDV on CCPI is zero 
in the structural equation. The results suggest that we can reject the null of no effect of 
individualism on the CCPI at the 1% level. Additionally, the test of weak instruments of Cragg 
and Donald (1993) further lends credence to the strong instrument argument.  
Drawing causal interpretations based on the benchmark findings requires that the 
instruments have no direct effect on the adoption of climate change policies other than through 
individualistic cultures. The earlier discussion suggests that this assumption is unlikely to be 
violated. Given that the number of instruments is larger than the number of endogenous 
regressors, I partly check for the exclusion restrictions by conducting the test of over-
identifying restrictions. It is important to highlight that the validity of the exclusion restrictions 
cannot be tested directly mainly because of the unobserved nature of the error terms. For this 
reason, the empirical exercise presented here just partly lends some support to the assumption 
that my instruments are plausibly exogenous. Overall, I find that we fail to reject the over-
identifying restrictions at conventionally accepted levels of significance. This at least in part 
lends some credence to the validity of my instruments. For this reason, the IV-2SLS estimates 
provide a valid basis for causal inference.   
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
Omitted variable bias 
The benchmark results rely on using plausibly exogenous sources of variation in individualism 
to achieve causal inference. This empirical exercise at least partially addresses a concern about 
omitted variable bias. This is because I employ the components of individualism that are 
uncorrelated with the error terms to explain cross-country differences in the stringency of 
climate change policies. I further check for this potential bias by incorporating a range of 
control variables in the regression, as represented in Tables 2 and 3.17 The benchmark results 
are reproduced mainly for purposes of comparison. 
As found by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), the cultural dimension of individualism-
collectivism helps explain the cross-country variation in GDP per capita via affecting 
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institutional quality. There also exists a voluminous literature arguing that geographic 
endowments, either directly or indirectly, lie at the root of long-term comparative development 
across the world. In particular, geography may affect income levels through shaping 
motivations to work or the quality of institutions.18 Hence, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) 
include a number of geographic controls in their regressions. If geography matters for 
institutional quality and income levels, it may also affect the implementation of climate change 
policies through these channels. As such, the positive effect of individualistic cultures on 
climate change policies may just reflect a proxy for the persistent effect of geographic 
endowments. To address this concern, I incorporate several geographic controls in the 
benchmark model, such as latitude, distance to coast, a landlocked dummy, mean elevation, 
and precipitation (column 2, Table 2).19 Accordingly, the estimated coefficients of 
individualism appear to be highly precise even when I rule out the potential bias of omitting 
geographic controls.  
Some recent contributions to the literature on cross-country differences in climate change 
regulations emphasize the role of a country’s legal heritage (Fredriksson & Wollscheid, 2015;  
Ang & Fredriksson, 2017). These scholars posit that common-law countries have weaker 
climate change policies than their civil-law counterparts. Indeed, legal origin has been well 
documented as a key driver of comparative prosperity across the world (see, e.g., La Porta et 
al., 1999;  La Porta et al., 2008;  Klerman et al., 2011). Therefore, my findings may be biased 
and inconsistent if I fail to account for this effect.20 The baseline estimates, however, remain 
largely unchanged (column 3, Table 2).  
Another concern is that my findings may be confounded by a country’s level of 
fractionalization and social trust. The basic argument for this holds that an ethnolinguistically-
diversified economy may be subject to lower income levels, poorer governance and a weaker 
capacity to provide public resources (La Porta et al., 1999;  Alesina et al., 2003). These factors 
are essential for improving environmental and climate change regulations. Further, social 
capital may shape overall social tolerance toward the wellbeing of others, thus strengthening 
                                                          
18
 Examples of such empirical studies include Bloom et al. (1998), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Sachs (2003), Rodrik 
et al. (2004), and Carstensen and Gundlach (2006).  
19
 These variables have been widely used in the long-term comparative development literature. Because there 
exists a voluminous literature linking geography and economic performance, I maintain the use of geographic 
endowments in the remaining sensitivity checks. 
20
 I follow the classification by Klerman et al. (2011) to include dummies of legal traditions. More specifically, I 
incorporate two dummies for common law and mixed law in the regression. The base group, which includes civil 
law and other laws, is excluded for comparison.  
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climate-friendly actions. For this reason, I control for an index of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and a measure of social trust.21 As shown in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2, 
the effect of individualism on climate change policies remains precisely estimated. When all 
additional controls are added in one regression, the results are still statistically significant at 
conventionally accepted levels although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient reduces 
considerably (column 6, Table 2). 
Following Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), I control for a number of factors that have 
been well documented in the literature as key determinants of long-term comparative 
development in Table 2. Accordingly, the baseline results remain largely insensitive to this 
consideration. I further check the possibility that the benchmark findings are confounded by 
some other proximate determinants of climate change policies.22 Specifically, one may well 
argue that in countries with higher levels of CO2 emissions, producers have stronger incentives 
to use bribes to maintain weak environmental regulations (Fredriksson & Neumayer, 2013). 
Thus, I include this variable in column (2) of Table 3. As pointed out by Neumayer (2002b), 
trade openness may facilitate international cooperation in environmental regulations. 
Nevertheless, it may also hinder multilateral environmental agreements if such cooperation is 
harmful for exporting economies (Neumayer, 2002b). I account for this effect in column (3) of 
Table 3.  
Further, countries in which oil and fossil fuel resources account for a significant 
proportion of their exports may be less likely to adopt climate change policies. Therefore, I add 
fuel exports to the regression (column 4, Table 3). A final concern is that countries who are 
more vulnerable to climate variability may have stronger incentives to implement climate 
change policies (Mavisakalyan & Tarverdi, 2019). Therefore, I include an index of climate 
vulnerability in column (5) of Table 3. All additional controls are added to the final column of 
Table 3.23 Overall, my results are largely robust to including additional control variables. 
                                                          
21
 Social trust is obtained from the World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp). This 
measure is calculated by the fraction of survey respondents’ who agree with the statement “most people can be 
trusted”. Further, I obtained data on cross-country differences in ethnolinguistic fractionalization from La Porta 
et al. (1999). 
22
 Additional controls used in Table 3 are “proximate” determinants of the stringency of climate change policies 
because they are generally interrelated with and jointly determined by the dependent variable. Hence, they may 
be potential channels through which cultural values, which are a deeper or more fundamental determinant of 
climate change policies, exert an influence on CCPI. 
23
 Data on CO2 emissions per capita, trade openness, and fuel exports (as a percentage of merchandised exports) 
are collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indictors. I calculate averaged values of these variables 
from 1990 to 2010, which is consistent with the period coverage of the CCPI. To capture the cross-country 
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Interestingly, most of these additional controls have no statistically significant influence on the 
stringency of climate change policies.24 This suggests that the cultural dimension of 
individualism-collectivism plays a more important role in explaining the cross-country 
variation in climate change regulations.      
Measurement bias 
Another challenge in obtaining valid statistical inference lies in potential measurement 
bias. As demonstrated earlier, this issue may be induced by using a perception-based measure 
of cultural values. In addition, the construction of the CCPI partly relies on experts’ 
assessments of a country’s cooperation toward multilateral environmental agreements. To 
address this concern, I first reproduce the baseline estimates using alternative proxies for 
individualism (Table 4). Variables’ descriptions and data sources are presented in the notes to 
Table 4. Using these alternative measures of individualistic cultures constrains the feasible 
sample size significantly (Table 4). Nevertheless, the baseline findings remain largely robust 
to adopting a variety of individualism indicators. 
As far as I am aware, the index of climate change policies of Bernauer and Böhmelt 
(2013) provides a comprehensive measure of cross-country differences in the stringency of 
climate change regulations. To check for robustness to using this indicator, I employ 
conventionally used measures of a country’s overall environmental performance. This 
empirical exercise also sheds light on the effect of individualism on environmental 
performance, which has received little attention in existing macro-level research. It is plausible 
that stringent environmental regulations improves the capacity to combat global warming. To 
this end, I use an index of environmental sustainability in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.25 
Further, I employ the Environmental Performance Index in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5.26 
The estimates reported in Table 5 indicate that individualism has a positive effect on 
                                                          
variation in climate vulnerability, I employ an index of global climate risk published by Germanwatch 
(https://www.germanwatch.org/en/cri).  
24
 The estimated coefficients of CO2 emissions per capita, trade openness and climate vulnerability are statistically 
insignificant at conventionally accepted levels. The effect of fuel exports on the stringency of climate change 
policies is negative and precisely estimated at the 5% level of significant, which is consistent with my predictions. 
These results are not presented in Table 3 to conserve space, but are available upon request. 
25
 This indicator is constructed by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Yale University and the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University, in collaboration with the 
World Economic Forum and the European Commission (Esty et al., 2005).  
26
 I use the results taken from the most recent report conducted in 2019 by the Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy (https://epi.envirocenter.yale.edu/). This index has been widely used in empirical studies exploring the 
environmental impacts of economic performance.  
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environmental performance across the world. This lends support to the main proposition that 
individualistic cultures help foster the stringency of climate change policies. 
Other robustness checks 
I report the results of other sensitivity tests in the online appendix.27 First, I replicate the 
baseline estimates using alternative samples. To do this, I exclude countries located in the same 
continent. This helps address a concern that the baseline findings are confounded by sample 
selection, or just reflect regional differences in climate change policies and cultural values. The 
results reported in Table A3 are largely similar to the baseline estimates. Second, I check for 
robustness to spatial dependence. In particular, cultural values may transcend borders because 
neighboring economies are more likely to interact with each other. Further, it is also plausible 
that clean technologies, which are essential for climate change mitigation, may transmit across 
countries through trade or investments. This arguably affects a country’s attitudes and policies 
toward global warming. As such, the error terms may be correlated across cross-sectional units 
in the sample, thus confounding the baseline findings. To mitigate this concern, I follow Conley 
(1999) and re-estimate the standard errors, accounting for potential spatial dependence (Table 
A4). The results, however, remain largely insensitive to this robustness test.  
Finally, I carry out several tests to check for robustness to the presence of outliers (Table 
A5). There are various methods of identifying outliers. For example, I estimate the Cook’s 
distance and exclude those with a value greater than a typical cut-point (four divided by the 
number of countries in this context). Next, I remove observations with a standardized residual 
bigger than 1.96. As suggested by Li (1985), I perform robust regression weights, and use these 
weights to re-estimate the benchmark model. My results, however, appear to be highly 
precisely estimated even when I restrict the baseline sample size using different methods. 
Overall, I find that the baseline findings are largely insensitive to sample selection, spatial 
dependence, and the presence of outliers.   
5. A mechanism analysis 
The main proposition of the current study posits that the cultural dimension of individualism-
collectivism helps explain international differences in climate change policies by shaping 
institutional quality and female political representation. The benchmark findings lend strong 
                                                          
27
 See also the online appendix for detailed discussions on these additional robustness tests.  
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credence to this hypothesis. In this section, I further carry out some additional regressions to 
examine two main mechanisms of transmission discussed in Section 2. 
First, if the quality of governance and female participation in parliaments are key 
channels of influence, the inclusion of these variables in the benchmark model may result in 
the effect of individualism on climate change policies being imprecisely estimated. For this 
reason, I control for an index of governance quality (governance).28 I also include a measure 
of the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in the regression (female).29 
Further, individualism can foster economic performance, proxied by GDP per capita, through 
promoting institutional quality (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017). A more prosperous economy 
may arguably have better resources to adopt stringent climate change policies. Hence, I include 
GDP per capita as a control variable. The results reported in Table 6 indicate that the estimated 
effect of individualism on climate change policies becomes statistically insignificant when 
these variables are accounted for in the regression (except in column 4).30 The size of the effect 
also reduces significantly. This reveals that much of the effect of cultural values on climate 
change policies is working through the quality of governance, female political representation 
and income levels. In this regard, the findings in Table 6 help advance our understanding of 
several mechanisms explaining the relationship between cultures and climate change policies. 
Second, I regress different channels of influence on the baseline measure of individualism 
as shown in Table 7. To mitigate potential endogeneity bias, I also employ distB_UK and 
pathogen to isolate exogenous sources of variation in individualistic cultures. According to 
Table 7, individualism exerts a positive influence on income per capita, which lends strong 
support to the findings of Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017) (column 1). Hence, I find 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that individualism plays an essential role in shaping 
economic prosperity across countries. Consistent with the arguments in Section 2, I find that 
individualism positively affects the quality of governance and female political representation, 
which are two key mechanisms of transmission. The estimated effects are also statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all cases. The validity of the estimates in Table 7 is supported by 
                                                          
28
 I calculate the mean values of six dimensions of the quality of governance. Data are taken from the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators across the period 2000-2010. The period chosen is mainly dictated by the 
availability of data.  
29
 Following Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi (2019), I use this measure of female political representation. I collect 
data for this variable from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators from 1990 to 2010, and then estimate 
the averaged values.  
30
 When I control for women in parliaments, the estimated coefficient of individualism is still statistically 
significant at the 5% level, but its magnitude decreases considerably (see columns 1 and 4, Table 6).  
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the F test of excluded instruments and the test of over-identifying restrictions, which are 
broadly similar to those in Table 1.31 
Finally, I estimate the effect of governance and female political representation on climate 
change policies.32 As argued in Section 2, these channels help explain cross-country differences 
in the stringency of climate change policies. There also exist some endogeneity concerns when 
estimating the causal effect of governance and female on the implementation of climate change 
policies. To address these issues, I follow existing empirical studies examining the link between 
institutional quality, gender inequality and economic performance to select valid instrumental 
variables (Table 8). More specifically, I utilize the settler mortality rate constructed by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) as an instrument for governance. As shown in column (1) of Table 8, 
the quality of governance is negatively correlated with the settler mortality rate, which is 
consistent with the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2001). Importantly, I find that the exogenous 
component of governance exerts a positive and statistically significant influence on climate 
change policies. This finding is consistent with my proposition that individualism helps 
improve the quality of governance, thus fostering stringent climate change policies. 
It is also worth noting that data on settler mortality are only available for former colonies, 
which constrains the feasible sample size considerably. Hence, I follow some recent 
contributions asserting that the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV) helps explain cross-
country differences in institutional quality, and employ UV as an alternative instrument to 
maintain the baseline sample size essentially for the purposes of comparison (Ang et al., 2018;  
Vu, 2019, 2020).33 I report the results in column (2) of Table 8; these are broadly similar to 
                                                          
31
 The findings in Table 7 also lend strong support to recent empirical studies documenting a positive effect of 
individualism on institutions, gender inequality and economic performance (see, e.g., Kyriacou, 2016;  
Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2017;  Davis & Williamson, 2019).  
32
 The results shown in Table 6 suggest that income per capita is a potential mechanism of influence. According 
to Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017), cultures can affect economic prosperity through inducing good institutions 
that strengthen incentives for innovative activities. Higher levels of income may also foster institutional quality 
and provide available resources that promote the stringency of climate change policies. These arguments suggest 
that institutional quality is a key mediating channel. For this reason, I only estimate the effect of institutional 
quality and female political representation on climate change policies in Table 8, which partly helps explain the 
link between income levels and climate change regulations. Importantly, it is relatively challenging to find an 
exogenous instrument for GDP per capita to examine its causal effect on climate change policies.  
33
 In particular, Vu (2020) posits that countries with higher levels of UV face a long-lasting threat of contracting 
eye diseases, such as cataracts. This significantly shortens the period of work-life expectancy, thus inducing 
corruption via the horizon channel. In addition, the permanent risk of diseases also affects the early investment in 
obtaining human capital, resulting in fewer well-trained and competent bureaucrats who could focus on designing 
the rule of law. The prevalence of diseases in high UV regions also deters (historical) investment in cooperation 
by institutional building, and this is detrimental to modern institutional quality (Ang et al., 2018).       
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those in column (1). However, UV can also affect climate change policies via some other 
channels, thus invalidating the results. For this reason, I use both instruments in column (3) of 
Table 8 to conduct the test of over-identifying restrictions, which partially helps check for the 
exogeneity of the instruments. The positive effect of governance on climate change policies 
remains largely unchanged when I adopt both instruments in one regression. The value of the 
test of over-identifying restrictions lends some credence to the validity of my instruments. 
Overall, I find that the quality of governance has a positive effect on climate change policies, 
which is in line with the main hypothesis. 
From columns (4) to (6) of Table 8, I report the estimated effects of female on the 
stringency of climate change policies. Following Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi (2019), I use the 
length of time elapsed since women’ suffrage was granted as an instrumental variable for 
female.34 This empirical strategy is mainly motivated by the argument that a country’s history 
of suffrage provides plausibly exogenous variation in today gender roles because it is unlikely 
to directly affect modern-day economic outcomes (Mavisakalyan & Tarverdi, 2019). 
Accordingly, I find strong evidence that fostering women’s participation in national 
parliaments helps improve climate change policies (column 4, Table 8). I also utilize the timing 
of Neolithic transition as an alternative instrument in column (5) of Table 8. The main argument 
for this holds that countries that adopted sedentary agriculture earlier experience greater 
modern gender inequality (Hansen et al., 2015).35 To check for the violation of the exclusion 
restrictions, I include both these instruments in column (6) of Table 8. The test of over-
identifying restrictions provides support for the validity of my instruments. Importantly, the 
estimated coefficients of female on climate change policies remains largely robust to adding 
alternative instruments. 
To summarize, this section empirically investigates potential mechanisms through which 
individualism affects the stringency of climate change policies across the globe. Consistent 
with the main propositions, I find strong evidence supporting the notion that the cultural 
dimension of individualism-collectivism matters for climate change regulations through 
enhancing the quality of governance and female political representation.  
                                                          
34
 Data are obtained from the 2011-2012 Progress of the World’s Women report conducted by the UN Women – 
the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. This variable is measured by 
the number of years elapsed since women’s suffrage was granted in each country.  
35
 Hansen et al. (2015) postulate that agricultural history created cultural beliefs and norms of gender inequality, 
which matter for today’s gender roles. Further, an early transition to agriculture facilitated the historical adoption 
of technologies, which reduced female roles outside the household and increased fertility (Hansen et al., 2015).  
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6. Subnational evidence 
A central focus of this paper rests upon the premise that individualism fosters the stringency of 
climate change policies by promoting the quality of governance and female political 
representation. The international evidence presented above provides strong empirical support 
for this notion. The baseline findings also appear to be insensitive to performing a series of 
robustness checks. However, it is important to emphasize that a key remaining challenge of 
achieving causal inference stems from unobserved country-specific factors, which are difficult 
to account for properly in a cross-country framework. This concern, at least partially, is 
minimized by using exogenous components of individualistic cultures. To consider this issue 
more thoroughly, I carry out a subnational analysis in this section. 
As far as I know, data at the regional level for both climate change policies and 
individualistic cultures are not available. Fortunately, the World Values Survey, conducted 
through face-to-face interviews in roughly 100 countries, provides relevant information about 
individualism and pro-environmental behavior at the individual level. Therefore, I employ data 
across six waves from 1981 to 2014 to examine the relationship between individualistic 
cultures and attitudes towards pro-environmental policies. The main advantage of using these 
data is that I can control for unobserved country-specific factors by including country fixed 
effects in the regression. Further, the effect of time specific-factors can be accounted for by 
using wave fixed effects. I also utilize religion dummies to control for other religious and 
cultural factors that may shape the overall tolerance toward environmental regulations.36 
Unfortunately, the baseline instrumental variables vary at the country level. For this reason, I 
do not replicate IV-2SLS estimates in the cross-country analysis. 
To measure the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism, I construct an 
individual-level measure of individualism. More specifically, I draw from the following six 
questions to capture whether a survey respondent demonstrates an orientation toward 
individualism: (i) independence is an essential child quality; (ii) imagination is an essential 
child quality; (iii) obedience is not an important child quality; (iv) a survey participant does not 
live with his or her parents; (v) divorce is justifiable; (vi) private ownership of business should 
increase. These cultural values are broadly consistent with Hofstede’s definition of 
individualism-collectivism, and are widely used as measures of individualistic cultures (see, 
                                                          
36
 It is plausible that people sharing similar religious beliefs may have common cultural values and attitudes toward 
environmental protection. 
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e.g., Schwartz, 1994;  Vandello & Cohen, 1999;  Hamamura, 2012;  Beugelsdijk et al., 2015;  
Olsson & Paik, 2016;  Ang, 2019).37 Based on survey participants’ responses, I create an overall 
measure of individualism by using the first principal component of these values. Higher values 
of the summary index correspond to a more individualistic orientation.  
There is no question directly related to climate change policies in the World Values 
Survey. For this reason, instead, I employ respondents’ attitudes toward pro-environmental 
policies as an outcome variable. In particular, survey participants are asked whether enhancing 
environmental protection or economic growth is a priority. For ease of interpretation, I recode 
data for this variable, taking a value of one if respondents choose environmental protection and 
zero otherwise. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, I carry out probit 
regressions to estimate the marginal effect of individualism on pro-environmental policies at 
the individual level. A number of individual controls are also incorporated to mitigate potential 
omitted variables bias.38 
The individual-level evidence is reported in Table 9. An orientation toward individualism 
is positively associated with the probability that survey participants self-report positive views 
about pro-environmental policies. This is largely consistent with the cross-country evidence. 
This finding is also robust to accounting for a number of control variables and unobserved 
country-specific factors. Importantly, the results presented in Table 9 are in stark contrast with 
the findings of Xiang et al. (2019). Drawing from the psychological literature, the authors 
postulate that individuals who self-report an orientation toward individualistic cultures are less 
likely to take action on climate change. As argued earlier, their findings are based on 
conducting a survey of 182 undergraduate students in China, making it difficult to generalize 
the results across the world. My findings, by contrast, provide a broad understanding of the 
relationship between individualism and climate change policies. Even when using individual-
level data that are more comparable to Xiang et al. (2019), I find that individualism is positively 
associated with attitudes toward pro-environmental policies. 
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 According to Beugelsdijk et al. (2015), the country level measure of individualism based on responses from the 
Word Values Survey correlates 0.77 with Hofstede’s index of individualistic cultures.   
38
 Specifically, I include age, age squared, income, dummies variable of being male, married, and having children. 
I also create two dummies of educational levels, including upper and middle educations with lower being excluded 
as the base group. Social trust is a binary variable reflecting whether survey participants agree “most people can 
be trusted”.  
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7. Conclusion 
Mitigating global warming requires adopting stringent environmental regulations to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. For this reason, the drivers of the stringency of climate change 
policies across the world are an important topic of debate not only for economists but also for 
policy-makers. This paper attempts to provide new insights into this line of inquiry by linking 
cultural values and climate change policies. More specifically, the main novelty of the current 
study lies in the premise that individualistic cultures foster the adoption of stringent climate 
change regulations. By contrast, collectivistic societies suffer from a weaker capacity to 
implement climate-friendly activities. 
To explore the above proposition, I carry out a wide range of empirical analyses at the 
country and subnational levels. In particular, I first estimate cross-sectional data using a world 
sample of countries. The cross-country evidence indicates that individualism positively affects 
climate change policies, which is consistent with my predictions. To maintain valid 
identification, I conduct a number of sensitivity tests none of which alters my findings. I also 
find evidence that individualism transmits to climate-friendly regulations through improving 
the quality of governance and women in parliaments. Using data from the World Values 
Survey, I further demonstrate that an orientation toward individualism is positively correlated 
with positive views to pro-environmental policies. This empirical exercise helps control for a 
number of confounding factors that are difficult to account for using a cross-country 
framework. The results lends strong credence to the international evidence. 
Several implications can be drawn from the findings of this paper. The empirical findings 
highlight that cultural values lie at the deep root of the stringency of climate change policies. 
In particular, this study suggests that collectivism emphasizes social relationships and 
collective actions, which are detrimental to the quality of governance. This arguably affects a 
country’s ability to foster climate-friendly activities. Further, individualistic societies have 
better capacity to combat global warming by strengthening women’s participation in 
legislation. A key implication from these findings is that environmental policies aiming at 
reducing global warming should consider the persistent effect of cultural values as given. 
Therefore, designing effective policies requires being compatible with the prevailing cultural 
environment. This is particularly important in collectivistic societies where their cultures 
hinder governance and gender equality, thus presenting significant challenges to combating 
global warming. 
23 
 
Further, fostering women political empowerment and institutional quality would be two 
potential mechanisms, as pointed out by this study, to address the negative consequences of 
existing cultural values. It is also necessary to avoid a misinterpretation of my findings that a 
cultural revolution is required to address climate change because such a drastic change in the 
cultural environment can be deleterious. By contrast, the main objective of this research is to 
advance our understanding of the deep origin of the stringency of climate change policies 
across the world. To my knowledge, this paper, for the first time, puts forward the idea that 
individualistic cultures help strengthen the capacity to adopt climate change policies from a 
cross-country perspective. Hence, it is hoped that these results motivate a fruitful discussion 
on the link between cultural values and climate-friendly policies in future research. 
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Figure 1. Cross-country differences in the stringency of climate change policies 
Notes: This figure illustrates international differences in the implementation of climate change regulations, 
measured by the CCPI. Darker regions reflect more stringent climate change actions.  
 
Figure 2. Cross-country differences in individualism (IDV) 
Notes: This figure illustrates international differences in cultural values, measured by Hofstede’s (2001) index of 
individualism. Darker regions correspond to more individualistic areas.   
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Panel A. Individualism and CCPI Panel B. Individualism and EPI 
 
Panel C. Individualism and ESI 
Figure 3. Correlation between individualism and the environment 
Notes: These figures demonstrate the correlation between the index of individualism and different measures 
capturing cross-country differences in the stringency of climate change policies. EPI and ESI stand for the 
Environmental Performance index and the Environmental Sustainability index, respectively. See also the online 
appendix for variables’ descriptions and data sources.  
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Table 1. Main results 
Estimator 
OLS  IV-2SLS 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Regression of climate change policies on individualism 
IDV 0.017***  0.040*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 
 [0.006]  [0.012] [0.008] [0.007] 
      
Panel B. Regression of IDV on instrumental variables 
Blood distance from the UK (distB_UK)   -16.136***  -8.638*** 
   [2.441]  [2.541] 
Historical pathogen prevalence (pathogen)    -23.205*** -17.720*** 
    [2.151] [2.401] 
      
Diagnostics       
First-stage F statistics   43.68 116.40 66.26 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics   46.77 80.23 52.87 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test   19.00 13.89 12.44 
Endogeneity [p-value]   0.018 0.069 0.007 
Over-id [p-value]     0.370 
      
Observations 92  92 92 92 
First-stage R-squared n/a  0.346 0.467 0.539 
Notes: Diagnostics tests include the F test of excluded instruments, the Cragg-Donald test of weak instruments, 
and the test of robust inference with weak instruments (see, e.g., Anderson & Rubin, 1949;  Cragg & Donald, 
1993;  Sanderson & Windmeijer, 2016). Further, endogeneity denotes the test of exogeneity of regressors 
(Hausman, 1978). Over-id is the test of over-identifying restrictions. All regressions include an intercept, which 
is omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2. Individualism and climate change policies, adding controls 
 
Baseline  Adding control variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the CCPI 
IDV  0.033***  0.045*** 0.031*** 0.022** 0.026*** 0.022* 
 [0.007]  [0.012] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.013] 
        
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the IDV 
distB_UK -8.638***  -7.757*** -9.899*** -9.977*** -8.769*** -9.877*** 
 [2.541]  [2.567] [2.547] [2.747] [2.657] [2.733] 
pathogen -17.720***  -16.203*** -19.361*** -22.327 -16.618 -13.434*** 
 [2.401]  [3.213] [2.628] [3.084] [3.348] [4.033] 
        
Controls        
Latitude   ✔    ✔ 
Distance to coast   ✔    ✔ 
Landlocked    ✔    ✔ 
Mean elevation   ✔    ✔ 
Precipitation    ✔    ✔ 
Common law    ✔   ✔ 
Mixed law    ✔   ✔ 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization     ✔  ✔ 
Social trust      ✔ ✔ 
        
First-stage F-statistics 66.26  27.25 86.26 64.96 30.86 27.62 
Over-id [p-value] 0.370  0.824 0.522 0.733 0.141 0.504 
Observations 92  82 88 72 78 66 
First-stage R-squared 0.539  0.660 0.601 0.615 0.566 0.777 
Notes: ✔ denotes the inclusion of control variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 3. Robustness to controlling for other effects 
 
Baseline  Controlling for other effects 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the CCPI 
IDV 0.045***  0.067** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.062** 
 [0.012]  [0.026] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.026] 
        
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the IDV 
distB_UK -7.757***  -6.629** -7.349*** -7.538*** -7.813*** -5.995** 
 [2.567]  [2.577] [2.648] [2.613] [2.586] [2.709] 
pathogen -16.203***  -9.332** -17.159*** -16.305*** -15.971*** -9.529** 
 [3.213]  [3.727] [3.353] [3.294] [3.295] [3.899] 
        
Controls        
CO2 emission per capita   ✔    ✔ 
Trade openness    ✔   ✔ 
Fuel exports     ✔  ✔ 
Climate vulnerability      ✔ ✔ 
Geographic controls ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
        
First-stage F-statistics 27.25  9.27 29.72 25.28 26.11 8.99 
Over-id [p-value] 0.824  0.786 0.871 0.715 0.998 0.638 
Observations 82  82 81 81 80 78 
First-stage R-squared 0.660  0.714 0.666 0.664 0.662 0.728 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
33 
 
Table 4. Using different measures of individualism 
 
Baseline 
 
Embeddedness  
 Affective 
autonomy 
 Intellectual 
autonomy 
 Tang & Koveos’s 
(2008) index 
 In-group 
favoritism 
 Cultural 
tightness  
index 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the CCPI 
IDV  0.045***  1.693***  1.438***  2.105***  0.023*  1.059***  0.021** 
 [0.012]  [0.492]  [0.472]  [0.631]  [0.013]  [0.331]  [0.010] 
              
Panel A. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the IDV 
distB_UK -7.757***  -0.238***  -0.228***  -0.208***  -6.835***  -0.209**  -16.363*** 
 [2.567]  [0.042]  [0.064]  [0.039]  [2.452]  [0.089]  [4.799] 
pathogen -16.203***  -0.219***  -0.349***  -0.134**  -21.024***  -0.695***  -22.901** 
 [3.213]  [0.072]  [0.097]  [0.059]  [4.688]  [0.169]  [8.792] 
Geographic 
controls 
✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
              
First-stage F-
statistics 
27.25  48.81  18.69  27.41  21.24  15.95  16.73 
Over-id [p-value] 0.824  0.549  0.951  0.384  0.610  0.355  0.747 
Observations 82  59  59  59  45  73  48 
First-stage R-
squared 
0.660  0.672  0.585  0.629  0.759  0.400  0.529 
Notes: From columns (1) to (7), I use different measures of individualism. In particular, data for embeddedness, affective autonomy and intellectual autonomy are collected 
from Schwartz (1994, 2004). I also use an index of individualism developed by Tang and Koveos (2008). Following Van de Vliert (2011), I utilize an indicator of in-group 
favoritism to capture cross-country differences in culture values. Finally, I use a measure of cultural tightness across the world constructed by Uz (2015). For ease of 
interpretation, I re-transform embeddedness and in-group favoritism by multiplying them by minus one so that higher values correspond to more individualistic cultures. 
See also the online appendix for variables’ description and data sources. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 
and 2. 
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Table 5. Robustness to using alternative dependent variables 
 
Environmental sustainability index  Environmental performance index 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. 
Dependent variables are alternative measures of environmental stringency 
IDV 0.292*** 0.384***  0.615*** 0.643*** 
 [0.052] [0.074]  [0.075] [0.110] 
      
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the IDV 
distB_UK -8.517*** -7.524***  -8.596*** -7.523*** 
 [2.469] [2.503]  [2.468] [2.502] 
pathogen -17.813*** -16.342***  -17.540*** -16.238*** 
 [2.418] [3.211]  [2.403] [3.229] 
Geographic controls  ✔   ✔ 
      
First-stage F-statistics 65.65 28.79  66.82 28.15 
Over-id [p-value] 0.407 0.962  0.329 0.057 
Observations 95 85  96 84 
First-stage R-squared 0.539 0.660  0.539 0.660 
Notes: Alternative dependent variables are two measures of overall environmental performance. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 6. Controlling for transmission mechanisms 
 
Baseline  Controlling for channels of transmission 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Second-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the CCPI 
IDV  0.045***  0.025 0.016 0.039** 0.015 
 [0.012]  [0.029] [0.040] [0.016] [0.055] 
GDP per capita (log)   0.237   0.033 
   [0.325]   [0.324] 
Governance     0.640  0.514 
    [0.757]  [0.764] 
Female in parliament (%)     0.015 0.007 
     [0.022] [0.019] 
       
Panel B. First-stage estimates. Dependent variable is the IDV 
distB_UK -7.757***  -4.847* -4.360* -7.392*** -3.721 
 [2.567]  [2.659] [2.504] [2.679] [2.537] 
pathogen -16.203***  -10.391 -5.939 -14.631*** -5.542 
 [3.213]  [3.765] [4.222] [3.512] [4.520] 
Geographic controls ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
       
First-stage F-statistics 27.25  6.42 3.32 16.40 2.26 
Over-id [p-value] 0.824  0.754 0.435 0.748 0.401 
Observations 82  81 78 82 77 
First-stage R-squared 0.660  0.695 0.753 0.668 0.757 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 7. The effect of individualism on channels of influence 
Dependent variable 
GDP per capita (log)  Governance  Female in parliaments 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel A. Regression of channels of influence on the IDV 
IDV 0.073***  0.044***  0.348*** 
 [0.010]  [0.006]  [0.076] 
      
Panel B. Regression of individualism on instrumental variables 
distB_UK -7.523***  -7.608***  -7.524*** 
 [2.502]  [2.501]  [2.503] 
pathogen -16.238***  -16.083***  -16.342*** 
 [3.229]  [3.292]  [3.211] 
Geographic controls ✔  ✔  ✔ 
      
First-stage F-statistics 28.15  25.03  28.79 
Over-id [p-value] 0.789  0.517  0.317 
Observations 84  79  85 
First-stage R-squared 0.661  0.663  0.660 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 8. The effect of governance and female in parliament on climate change policies 
 
Governance and climate change policies  Female in parliaments and climate change policies 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Second stage estimates. Dependent variable is the CCPI 
Governance  0.808*** 0.616** 0.658**     
 [0.285] [0.296] [0.289]     
Female in parliament      0.103** 0.098** 0.100*** 
     [0.044] [0.046] [0.035] 
        
Panel B. First-stage estimates 
Dependent variable 
Governance  Female in parliament 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Settler mortality (log) -0.449***  -0.237***     
 [0.066]  [0.082]     
Ultraviolet radiation  -0.011*** -0.008***     
  [0.001] [0.002]     
Women’s suffrage     0.182***  0.141*** 
     [0.051]  [0.048] 
Neolithic transition      -2.152*** -1.822*** 
      [0.484] [0.489] 
Geographic controls ✔ ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
        
First-stage F-statistics 46.25 95.49 41.68  12.77 19.73 18.98 
Over-id [p-value] n/a n/a 0.377  n/a n/a 0.943 
Observations 39 78 39  82 82 82 
First-stage R-squared 0.543 0.611 0.678  0.158 0.182 0.253 
Notes: Governance is an averaged index of six Worldwide Governance Indicators, taken from the World Bank’s data. Female in parliament represents women’s 
political participation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 9. Individual-level evidence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable is pro-environmental policies 
Individualism 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Male 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Age  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Married -0.003 -0.007 -0.000 -0.001 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
No children -0.038*** -0.040*** 0.004 0.006 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Income  0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Education [upper] 0.215*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.210*** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
Education [middle] 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] 
Social trust 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.113*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] 
Wave FE  ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Country FE   ✔ ✔ 
Religion FE    ✔ 
     
Observations 181,610 181,610 181,610 175,886 
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.009 0.048 0.048 
Regression model Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy, taking a value of one if survey participants agree that environmental 
protection is a priority and zero if their choice is economic growth. Individualism is constructed by using the first 
principal component of six values of individualistic cultures as presented in the main text. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
  
